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Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Mont. 2010).
Matt Pugh
ABSTRACT
The court in Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar considered whether the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service‟s 2009 Final Rule delisting the gray wolf in Montana and Idaho violated the
Endangered Species Act (ESA). At issue was whether the language of the ESA permitted the
agency to list or delist a portion of a distinct population segment of gray wolves. The court
rejected the delisting decision, finding it was essentially a political solution that did not comply
with the ESA.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the gray wolf‟s reintroduction to the northern Rocky Mountains, competing
interests have debated the management and protection paradigms afforded to this species under
the Endangered Species Act (ESA).91 The court in Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar characterized
the controversy surrounding wolves as “steeped in stentorian agitprop.”92 Despite the varied
sentiment on the topic, the court largely avoided the political and scientific arguments, and
instead focused primarily on the issue of statutory interpretation. The essence of the claim was
whether or not the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (Service) may legally list only a portion of a
distinct population segment (DPS) pursuant to the mandates of the ESA.93 The court held that
the northern Rocky Mountain gray wolf DPS must be listed or delisted as a complete unit,
allowing consistent protection across the population.94 The decision in this case has broad
implications for species management under the ESA.
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Though wolves were once abundant throughout most of North America, hunting and a
government-sponsored eradication program resulted in their extirpation across most of their
historic range.95 By the 1930s, the wolf populations in Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming were
eliminated.96 Consequently, the northern Rocky Mountain gray wolf was listed as an endangered
species in 1974.97
In 1987, the Service developed a wolf recovery plan with a goal of establishing at least
ten breeding pairs and 100 wolves for three consecutive years in three core recovery areas:
northwestern Montana, central Idaho, and the greater Yellowstone area.98 A 1994
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) found the plan to be “reasonably sound” and sufficient to
“maintain a viable wolf population in the foreseeable future,” but predicted long-term persistence
could require at least thirty breeding pairs and more than 300 wolves with genetic exchange
between subpopulations.99
After successful reintroduction efforts, the northern Rocky Mountain wolf population
achieved the numeric recovery goal of thirty breeding pairs and 300 individuals starting in 2000
and continuing every year thereafter.100 In light of the species‟ rapid recovery and growing
population, the Service began the delisting process in 2007 by identifying the northern Rocky
Mountain DPS.101 This DPS included all of Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming, as well as portions
of eastern Washington, eastern Oregon, and northern Utah.102
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The 2008 DPS designation and delisting was challenged by twelve environmental
advocacy groups, all of whom are parties in the present action.103 The court granted a
preliminary injunction in July 2008 to enjoin implementation of the 2008 Rule, and later vacated
and remanded it to the Service for further consideration.104 The court found that the Service
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in delisting the DPS without evidence of sufficient genetic
exchange and in relying on Wyoming‟s 2007 wolf management plan, which failed to manage for
fifteen breeding pairs and included a “malleable trophy game area.”105
On remand, the Service reopened the comment period and issued a new Final Rule in
April 2009.106 The Final Rule included new data demonstrating genetic exchange between
subpopulations and continued numerical sufficiency.107 The Final Rule further noted that
Montana and Idaho had the requisite laws, plans, and regulations to ensure a healthy population,
while Wyoming‟s regulatory framework failed to meet ESA requirements.108 Considering this,
the Final Rule removed ESA protections throughout the northern Rocky Mountain DPS, except
in Wyoming.109 Subsequently, Montana and Idaho authorized public wolf hunts beginning in
September 2009.110
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In response to the 2009 Final Rule delisting the wolf in all of the DPS except Wyoming,
Defenders of Wildlife sought judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act111 and the
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ESA.112 The Greater Yellowstone Coalition filed a similar challenge, and the two cases were
consolidated on June 12, 2009.113 The plaintiffs were joined by other environmental advocacy
groups. Other parties, including the State of Montana and the State of Idaho, intervened in
support of the Final Rule.114
Defenders of Wildlife listed nine separate reasons why the delisting violated the ESA:
(1) it violated the statute by partially protecting a listed species; (2) it was based on outdated and
unscientific recovery targets; (3) there was a lack of genetic connectivity to support the decision;
(4) the regulatory mechanisms inadequately protected wolves without the protection of the ESA;
(5) the Service failed to consider loss of historic range when determining whether the wolves
were recovered; (6) the Service disregarded the status of gray wolves throughout the lower-fortyeight states; (7) the decision violated the ESA by delisting a previously unlisted population of
wolves; (8) the DPS boundaries were defined contrary to the ESA and the Service‟s own policy;
and (9) the decision impermissibly designated wolves in Wyoming as a “non-essential,
experimental” population.115
Plaintiff Greater Yellowstone Coalition challenged the decision for violating the ESA on
five counts: (1) the Service arbitrarily assessed current and future genetic connectivity; (2) the
regulatory mechanisms were inadequate to assure genetic connectivity; (3) the decision violated
the ESA by partially protecting a listed population; (4) the Service failed to consider loss of
historic range; and (5) the decision impermissibly designated wolves in Wyoming as a “nonessential, experimental” population.116
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In August 2009, the plaintiffs‟ motions for a preliminary injunction to suspend the Montana
and Idaho wolf hunts were denied because they failed to show irreparable harm given the limited
number of wolves authorized for taking by hunting.117
IV. ANALYSIS
The principal argument in this case was the plaintiffs‟ claim that the plain terms of the
ESA did not permit the Service to list only a portion of a DPS as endangered.118 The plaintiffs
argued that an agency-created sub-DPS taxonomy violated the ESA and was beyond Congress‟
authorization.119 In reaching its decision, the court examined the plain meaning of the language,
as well as the statutory construction and legislative history of the ESA.120
The court first examined the three step listing/delisting process.121 First, the Service must
identify the species taxonomically, and also recognize any subspecies or DPSs.122 Next, the
Service must decide whether to list a species as either threatened or endangered, or to delist the
species.123 The final step in the process is listing a species in the Federal Register and specifying
the portion of its range where it is endangered or threatened.124 After taking these steps, critical
habitat must also be identified within the species‟ range.125
Through this process, the Service determined the northern Rocky Mountain gray wolf
DPS was in danger of extinction throughout a significant portion of its range (Wyoming), but
then only applied the ESA protections to that one geographic area of the DPS.126 The plaintiffs
argued that the whole northern Rocky Mountain DPS must be listed or delisted at the same
117
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management level.127 The plaintiff‟s argument was supported by the Service‟s historical view
that the ESA prohibited a legal taxonomy smaller than a DPS.128 In order to rule on this, the
court examined the 2009 Final Rule to determine whether its statutory interpretation of certain
language was a permissible construction of the ESA.129
The plaintiffs also argued that an “endangered species” meant any species, subspecies, or
DPS “in danger throughout a significant portion of its range.”130 Conversely, the defendants
contended the phrase “endangered species” meant any species in danger of extinction throughout
all or a significant portion of its range.131 In addition, the defendants claimed that the language
“significant portion of its range” suggested the ESA is ambiguous regarding what must be
protected as endangered.132 The court rejected the defendants‟ interpretation of the statutory
language, finding the phrase “significant portion of its range” dictated when a species is
endangered as opposed to where a species is endangered.133 Furthermore, it held that
interpreting “endangered species” to mean any wolf in the DPS that is in danger throughout a
significant portion of the DPS went against the plain language of the ESA.134 Pursuant to the
statute, the court ruled the term “species” referred to the entity to be listed or delisted and the
range that species, subspecies, or DPS occupied.135
The defendants next argued that the plaintiffs‟ reading of the statute rendered the word
“or” in the phrase “in danger throughout all or a significant portion of its range” superfluous.136
Such an interpretation would have allowed the Service to stop its analysis once it found danger
127
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across a significant portion of a species‟ range; thus, never having to determine if a species was
in danger throughout all of its range.137 Legislative history showed the language “or a significant
portion of its range” was added in 1973 to allow for protection of a species even when not
threatened with worldwide extinction.138 In light of this history, the court found the plaintiffs‟
interpretation of the statute avoided rendering it superfluous or redundant.139 The court also
noted that different portions of a DPS could be weighted differently when determining whether
to list an entire DPS, and that when a DPS is listed as threatened, protections can vary within that
DPS.140 However, none of the cases cited by the defendants supported the proposition that the
ESA allowed for partial listings or protections of a statutorily defined DPS.141
The defendants next argued that the publishing requirements of Section 4(c)(1) of the
ESA, requiring the Secretary to “specify with respect to each species over what portion of its
range it is endangered or threatened,” was ambiguous and allowed the Service to remove species
protections from part of a DPS. 142 The court rejected the defendants‟ interpretation of the statute
because it ignored the fact that the publishing requirement comes only after the Service
determines the status of a species, and allowing a publishing requirement to alter a substantive
determination under the ESA would be senseless.143
The publishing requirement provision required the Secretary to list the species‟ common
and scientific names and include over what portion of the species‟ range it was endangered or
threatened.144 Without the listing of the species range there would be no way to identify if a
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species was listed below its taxonomic level.145 In the 2009 Final Rule, the Service included
“Northern Rocky Mountain DPS” with the common name and listed Wyoming as the range in
which the wolf was endangered.146 The court found that including the DPS with the common
name impermissibly allowed the Service to remove protections over a range smaller than the
DPS.147 The definition of “species” applies to all sections of the ESA and excludes distinctions
below a DPS.148
Having determined that the ESA unambiguously prohibited the Service from listing or
protecting part of a DPS, the court turned to whether the Service‟s decision deserved
deference.149 Deference can only exist when an agency changes policy in a reasoned fashion that
is adequately justified.150 The Service stated in previous Final Rules that delisting can occur
only when a species (or subspecies or DPS) is recovered.151 Additionally, the Service stated that
DPS boundaries could not be subdivided and wolves could not be delisted on a state-by-state
basis.152 Since the approach taken in the 2009 Final Rule was clearly inconsistent with the
Service‟s previous pronouncements, the “convenient switch” to its current interpretation was
given little deference by the court.153
After refusing to give deference to the Service‟s abrupt change in policy, the court
analyzed whether its interpretation was permissible under the ESA.154 An interpretation will be
upheld as reasonable if it “reflects a plausible construction of the statute‟s plain language and
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does not otherwise conflict with Congress‟ expressed intent.”155 Plaintiffs challenged the
reasonableness of the Service‟s interpretation of the ESA because it rendered the concept of the
DPS superfluous, allowed for protection of plants and invertebrates in a manner explicitly
against Congress‟ intent, and thwarted the overall purpose of the law.156 In 1978, Congress
amended the definition of “species” by removing taxonomic categories below subspecies in an
effort to preserve the Service‟s ability to protect populations of the same species differently,
while preventing listing a population at the level of a “city park.”157 If the Service were allowed
to selectively apply protections to just part of a species, the DPS concept would be redundant.158
The Service‟s interpretation of the ESA produced a strained result when applied to carry
out the purposes of the ESA.159 The court therefore held the Service could not apply protection
to wolves only in Wyoming and ensure that no portion of the DPS go extinct, despite adequate
regulations in Montana and Idaho.160
The ESA‟s legislative history provided additional guidance.161 In examining the
definition of “species” under the ESA, it was clear that nothing in the history of the statute
supported the contention that the Service was allowed to list a DPS, subdivide it, and then afford
only part of the DPS the mandated protections.162 Listing a DPS in three states, but only
protecting it in one, is not supported by the ESA.163 Therefore, the 2009 Final Rule did not
comply with the law to the extent that it partially listed or only protected a portion of the DPS.164
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Plaintiffs contended the 2009 Final Rule must be vacated and set aside, while the
defendants sought a remand without vacating the Final Rule.165 Montana argued that vacating
the Final Rule was unnecessary, since the only difference between state and federal management
was wolf hunts, and the 2009 hunt only reduced the population of wolves in Montana from 497
to 493; remand was therefore the appropriate remedy.166 While the court noted the practical
appeal of this argument, the court ultimately vacated the Final Rule because it unlawfully failed
to list and protect the entire DPS.167
V. CONCLUSION
The court held that the northern Rocky Mountain DPS of the gray wolf must be listed or
delisted as a complete unit, allowing consistent protection across the population.168 Though it
recognized the Service‟s solution as pragmatic and even practical, the court rejected the 2009
Final Rule delisting the wolf throughout Montana and Idaho, finding it was in essence a political
solution that did not comply with the ESA.169
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